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This paper is a review of volatility trends, factors, and relationships in U.S. equity markets, with 
emphasis on the period of time from 1980 to the present, when volatility has been at higher 
levels than what had been observed earlier.  Both finance academics and investment 
professionals are affected by this ‘high-volatility’ environment, as it impacts the traditional 
relationships that connect risk and return, and can therefore alter both individual asset and 
portfolio allocation decisions.  Based on a thorough review of the literature on a stock’s 
idiosyncratic volatility, we explain why it has increased in recent times, discuss factors that 
affect volatility level, and provide an overview of the empirical relationship between current 
volatility levels and future expected return. At the end of each section, we pose a related idea 
for future research – there are ten such ideas offered.  The primary purposes of the paper are to 
convince the reader that volatility is an important investment consideration, to identify the major 
findings in recent volatility research, and to highlight some unanswered volatility questions for 
future academics and practitioners to explore. 
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INTRODUCTION: VOLATILITY DEFINITIONS AND TRENDS 
In an equity portfolio, investors should care about more than just the returns on each of their 
individual stocks.  More specifically, they should also worry about the volatility of each individual 
stock, as given by idiosyncratic, or firm-specific, volatility, since shifts in these levels may cause 
a previously diversified portfolio to become much less diversified.  Although investors can 
eliminate idiosyncratic volatility by holding a fully-diversified portfolio, many investors choose not 
to hold well-diversified portfolios.  For such investors, if the volatility for some portion of their 
individual stocks increases, they will need to add more stocks to their portfolio in order to 
achieve the same level of diversification, which will result in higher transaction costs (Xu & 
Malkiel, 2003).  Because investors require higher returns to invest in firms with larger 
idiosyncratic volatility (in order to compensate for the loss of diversification), there may be a 
positive link between idiosyncratic volatility and the cross-section of expected returns (Bali & 
Cakici, 2008). 
Furthermore, both abnormal event-related returns and stock prices in general depend on firm-
specific volatility, industry-level volatility, and market volatility (Campbell, et al., 2001).  The 
finance literature is clear in establishing links between idiosyncratic risk and subsequent returns, 
although less clear about the direction of this relationship.  Volatility also serves as a proxy for 
the divergence of opinion in the market (Guo & Savickas, 2006), and therefore, may affect the 
behavior of option traders and arbitrageurs, whose profits and hedging strategies will be 
impacted by how quickly prices change over a given time period.  Financial markets often 
overreact to idiosyncratic risk in the short-term, relative to what firm fundamentals may indicate. 
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The most well-known measure of volatility in U.S. markets is the VIX, which represents the 
implied volatility of a synthetic at-the-money option on the S&P 500 index that has a time to 
maturity of one month.  Here, the term ‘implied volatility’ refers to a specific volatility level for the 
option’s underlying asset (e.g. – a stock) that would produce the observed option price in the 
market.  In contrast, ‘historical volatility’ looks at some arbitrarily long past period of time, and 
measures the standard deviation of daily price changes (or the log of daily price changes) over 
that period.  If one uses historical volatility to estimate current or future volatility levels, it is 
implicitly, and often erroneously, assumed that past volatility trends will continue into the future. 
Because the VIX, commonly known as the ‘fear index,’ is known to have very high serial 
correlation (Ang, et al., 2006), the uncertainty of returns can be forecasted more readily than the 
absolute level of returns itself.  Market crashes tend to occur during periods of high sentiment 
(i.e. – when VIX is high), although the exact timing of these crashes is nearly impossible to 
predict (Baker & Wurgler, 2007).   
Volatility measures for asset prices can cover a wide variety of time frequencies.  Choices 
include daily, monthly, quarterly, annual, or even longer periods.  Jones and Wilson (2004) 
examine data from 1871-2000, and use 26 non-overlapping 5-year periods, with 60 monthly 
observations for each of the 26 five-year periods.  The three highest volatility sub-periods for 
stocks occurred from 1931-1935, 1936-1940, and 1926-1930, respectively.  Officer (1973) found 
that the variability of market returns declined between 1926 and 1960 due to the formation of 
the SEC in 1933, the institution of margin requirements in 1934, and a larger number of stocks 
being listed on the NYSE (so that the market itself became more diversified).  He also cited 
1942 as the year when market volatility ‘returned to the normalcy’ that existed before the Great 
Depression.  From 1940-1999, Jones and Wilson (2004) showed that individual stock volatilities 
remained relatively level, except for the 1986-1990 period, which was higher almost exclusively 
due to the October 1987 crash.  They also found that, after adjusting for inflation, stock 
volatilities were about 3 times higher than bond volatilities.  However, in the last half of the 20th 
century, the relative risk of stocks compared to that of bonds declined dramatically (since bond 
volatility has been increasing faster than stock volatility).  Although there is a positive 
relationship between current volatility and subsequent returns for bonds, this relationship can be 
negative for stocks. 
The VIX was high during the turbulent period from 2000-2002, low during the calm period of 
2003-2006, and high again during the financial crisis of 2007-2009.  When cross-sectional 
volatility, which measures the dispersion of stock returns within an index at a single sub-period 
in time, is low, like it was from 2003-2006, there are fewer opportunities for portfolio managers 
to earn superior alpha relative to their peers.  However, when cross-sectional volatility is high, 
as it was from 1998-2002 or 2007-2009, the range between good and bad investments will 
widen.  Note that, although the market decline in the recent financial crisis began in October 
2007 (the month of the all-time DJIA peak), it took almost a full year for volatility levels to really 
kick in.   
The initial primary driver for the sudden rise in volatility was increasing energy costs, which ate 
into corporate earnings and created much future uncertainty.  Then, in 2008, when Bear Sterns 
and Lehman Brothers collapsed, volatility levels continued their dramatic ascent, and persisted 
at alarmingly high levels due to fundamental problems within the financial services industry.  In 
2010-2011, the VIX fell from its financial crisis peak levels, although it was still quite high, but in 
2012, it receded even further back to normal levels (Bouchey, 2010).  This is surprising, since 
many analysts circa 2010-2011 were predicting the high-volatility environment to continue for 
several more years due to severe structural problems within the U.S. and other major world 
economies (Darnell, 2009). 
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In addition, U.S. stocks have been significantly more volatile than non-U.S. stocks.  From 1990-
2006, Bartram, Brown, and Stulz (2012) found that the stocks of U.S. firms were more volatile 
than comparable foreign firms across almost all years in the sample.  They introduce two types 
of volatility: ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ and attribute the volatility advantage more toward the good kind.  
‘Good volatility’ has been higher in the U.S. due to greater investor protection and stock market 
development, and more new patents and firm investment in research and development.  Thus, 
individual U.S. firms may have been more innovative, and exemplified higher risk taking and 
entrepreneurship levels than their foreign peers.  Meanwhile, non-U.S. firms have been exposed 
more to ‘bad volatility,’ which includes political risk and other country-specific forces that 
individual firms cannot control.  These forces tend to prevent growth and productivity, and foster 
an environment of instability and higher noise trading.  A related trend is that while U.S. stocks 
have exhibited higher firm-specific volatility, foreign firms have been exposed to greater 
systematic risk (Bartram et al., 2012). 
The main body of this article is organized as shown in the following table:  
 
No. Section Title Primary Question of Interest 
1 Idiosyncratic Volatility What are the various types of idiosyncratic 
volatility, and how are idiosyncratic volatility 
levels estimated? 
2 Explanations for Volatility 
Trending Upward 
Why has idiosyncratic volatility shown a general 
upward trend over the past 50 years? 
3 Determinants of Cross-
Sectional Volatility 
Which factors have been linked to both 
idiosyncratic and market volatility levels? 
4 The Relationship Between 
Return and Volatility 
What is the direction of the relationship between 
volatility and future return levels, and why is 
there such disagreement in the literature about 
this link? 
5 Factor Models for Explaining 
Excess Return 
Which factors have been linked to excess return, 
and how does this relate to idiosyncratic volatility 
levels? 
6 The Momentum Anomaly What is the momentum anomaly, and how does 
this relate to idiosyncratic volatility levels? 
7 Investor Sentiment How does investor sentiment contribute to 
extreme market volatility? 
8 Examples of Extreme 
Volatility Events 
What constitutes an ‘extreme volatility event,’ 
and what are some recent examples of such 
events? 
9 Managing Liquidity Amid 
Extreme Volatility 
When extreme volatility has been present, how 
has the market attempted to avoid a liquidity 
crisis? 
10 Managing Volatility with 
Derivatives 
How have call options, put options, and 




We also provide an idea for future volatility research (in italics), at the end of each upcoming 
section, along with corresponding implications for investment practitioners.  In addition, we 
conclude with a summary that reviews the primary purposes for this paper and its most 
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essential findings, and an inventory of remaining future research areas that will help enable both 
investors and academicians to better understand volatility. 
At this point, and throughout the majority of the upcoming discussion on volatility, the focus 
turns exclusively to one specific type of volatility: ‘idiosyncratic,’ or firm-specific volatility. 
IDIOSYNCRATIC VOLATILITY 
The primary measure of volatility in the finance literature is ‘idiosyncratic volatility (IV),’ which 
isolates the price risk for an individual firm.  Since a particular stock’s IV is not directly 
observable, it can only be estimated.  Xu and Malkiel (2003) identify two differing approaches to 
estimating IV: the direct method and the indirect method.  The direct method uses residuals 
from a factor model for excess returns, and defines IV to be the standard deviation of these 
residuals, so that aggregate IV (across all stocks) would be the weighted sum of these 
variances, where the weights are the market capitalizations of each stock.  The indirect method 
considers the difference between the weighted sum of the variance of stock returns (in excess 
of the risk-free rate) and the variance of market returns (also in excess of the risk-free rate). 
Arena et al. (2008) employ an alternative to the direct method, and calculate IV using residuals 
from a 2-factor model, where the factors are the market return and the market return 1-day 
earlier (so as to account for the effects of non-synchronous trading).  They also reference ‘FF 
IV,’ or Fama-and-French Idiosyncratic Volatility (Fama & French, 1993),’ which uses residuals 
from a 3-factor (size, value, and market return) model.  Brandt et al. (2010) calculate IV-like 
measures for each stock, each industry, and for each time period in their study, where all are 
based on the residuals between an individual stock return and its corresponding industry return, 
which are then aggregated upwards across industries and time periods.  Chua et al. (2010) start 
with the 3-factor Fama-and-French model, but then decompose IV into expected IV (EIV) and 
unexpected IV (UIV).  Here, after defining IV to be the sum of squared residuals from the factor 
model (across all days in a particular month), the EIV is formed using an AR(2) time series 
model, which relies on IV measures from the previous 2 months. Then, the UIV is simply the 
difference between IV and EIV for a particular month.  The purpose of UIV is to control for 
variation in unexpected returns, so that the true connection between IV and expected returns 
can be better understood.   
Bali and Cakici (2008) also use the direct method.  However, they note that the frequency of 
data used (e.g., daily or monthly), the weighting scheme used to generate average portfolio 
returns, the breakpoints used to sort stocks into portfolios, and the screening process for size, 
price, and liquidity effects can all have a material impact on the determination of IV.  For 
example, they calculate IV, both based on daily returns across each month in their sample, and 
monthly returns in aggregate, and find there to be a negative relationship between IV and 
returns for the daily data, but no link whatsoever for the monthly data.  However, after 
controlling for size, price, and liquidity effects, even the negative relationship that was observed 
when using the daily data mostly disappears.   
Guo and Savickas (2006) utilize the indirect method, and define aggregate IV to be a value-
weighted sum (across all stocks in a specific time period), based on the square of shocks to 
each stock’s excess returns.  Also, Jiang and Lee (2006) define IV to be the difference between 
average stock volatility and market volatility, which they calculate for each month between 1962 
and 2002, and do on both an equally-weighted and a value-weighted basis.  Meanwhile, Anrkim 
and Ding (2002) distinguish between cross-sectional volatility and ‘intertemporal volatility,’ which 
they define to be the variability of periodic returns over a long time horizon.   
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Campbell et al. (2001) try to decompose total volatility into idiosyncratic volatility, industry 
volatility, and market volatility, and note that idiosyncratic volatility is by far the largest 
component of total volatility.  Guo and Savickas (2006) also found that market volatility was 
much smaller than IV, but the two measures differ in a very important way; that is, whereby IV is 
negatively related to future stock returns, market volatility is positively related to future stock 
returns.  Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) note that periods of high IV do not necessarily 
correspond with periods of high market volatility, but also state that IV represents a larger 
component of total stock volatility than does market volatility. 
Research Idea #1: Classify the different types of volatility employed throughout the literature, 
and determine the primary applications for each type when modeling volatility mathematically.   
Note: All definitions of volatility types mentioned here are summarized succinctly in a Glossary 
at the end of this paper.  
Practical Implication #1: Option traders need to know a stock’s volatility because this is one of 
the six option pricing inputs.  There is a direct relationship between a stock’s volatility level and 
the value of both call and put option prices because when volatility increases, the expected 
payoff on both calls and puts must increase. 
EXPLANATIONS FOR VOLATILITY TRENDING UPWARD 
Both Brandt et al. (2010) and Campbell et al. (2001) observed a steady increase in idiosyncratic 
volatility (IV) from 1962 through 1997 for individual U.S. equities, even though aggregate market 
volatility and industry volatilities remained relatively constant during this period.  The average 
volatility of the most volatile stocks in the 1990s was 2-3 times larger than that of the most 
volatile stocks in the 1960s, and the average volatility of firm-level profitability rose 4-5 times 
from the 1960s to the late 1990s (Zhang, 2005).  However, Xu and Malkiel (2003) found that 
there has been no tendency for the most stable stocks to have increased (or decreased) in 
volatility over time.  Most of this increase occurred during the 1970s and 1980s, so that the 
increase in volatility from the 1980s to 1990s is smaller than what is commonly thought.   
While firm-specific IV increased even further through the Internet bubble of 1999-2001, it then 
fell dramatically by the bull market run of 2005-2007 (Menchero & Morozov, 2011).  Brandt et al. 
(2010) also observed a substantial decline in IV to normal long-term levels by 2003, and 
claimed that the same drivers of increasing IV in the late 1990s were just as responsible for IV 
falling again.  Most importantly, it appears that volatility data arrives in ‘episodes’ rather than via 
‘trends.’  Zhang (2010) also observed stock volatility increasing from 1976-2000, but reversing 
dramatically from 2001-2006 (with a brief upward surge in 2002).  By 2006, volatility levels were 
back to what they had been in the 1970s.  However, starting in late 2007, stock return volatilities 
started to climb again, and reached their all-time high in October 2008 (Zhang, 2010). 
The prevailing explanations for the long-term trend of increasing IV for equities have included 
increased institutional ownership, increased volatilities of firm fundamentals, newly listed firms 
getting younger and riskier, and product markets getting more competitive (Brandt et al., 2010).  
For example, firms are issuing stock much earlier in their life stage now, when there is often no 
earnings record or significant long-term prospects.  Between 1976 and 2000, the number of 
stocks on major U.S. exchanges doubled.  This may be because, around 1980, it became 
easier for new firms to get listed (especially on NASDAQ), as they no longer had to show a 
sustained history of profits to qualify.  Furthermore, many of the newer stocks are smaller, 
growth stocks with higher volatilities for both earnings and returns.  From 1976 to 2000, average 
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ROE levels in the U.S. declined while the variability of these ROE reports increased (Wei & 
Zhang, 2006).   
Another possible cause for increasing volatility is that investors have had increasing access to 
inexpensive trading opportunities, and have been able to both ‘day-trade’ and partake in 
‘financial innovation’ that was previously only done by corporate and institutional investors 
(Anrkim & Ding, 2010; Campbell, et al., 2001).  Although 24-hour trading is now possible, stock 
return volatility is higher when stock exchanges are open (Schwert, 1989).  Also, idiosyncratic 
volatility, at least from 1975 to 1998, was almost twice as large for NASDAQ stocks, as 
compared to NYSE or AMEX stocks; in fact, the increases in volatility observed since 1984 have 
been almost entirely from NASDAQ stocks, since volatility for NYSE/AMEX stocks has 
remained quite stable recently (Xu & Malkiel, 2003). 
Also, the percentage of total equity held by institutions (as opposed to individual investors) 
increased 8-fold from 1950 to 1998, and by 1998, about half of total volume was from block 
trades consisting of more than 10,000 shares from institutions (Xu & Malkiel, 2003).  Campbell 
et al. (2001) suggest two additional theories: more variability in cash flow shocks (compared to 
what is previously expected), and more variability in discount rate changes.  They claim that as 
conglomerates are increasingly broken up into smaller, more distinct, and less diversified parts, 
there arises higher variability in cash flow streams over time.  Also, as executives are 
increasingly given huge incentives to take more risks in order to maximize their expected 
compensation, this also favors less stability in cash flow streams.  Brandt et al. (2010) found 
that IV also increases as the ratio of a stock’s market value to book value increases, and that 
firms with low stock prices are the primary drivers of the increasing trend in IV through the late 
1990s and early 2000s.   
Campbell et al. (2001) also observed that volatility levels vary substantially across industry, and 
even more so than the IV levels for specific firms within the same industry.  The computer, 
telecommunications, and retail sectors have had the largest recent upward trends in volatility.  
Xu and Malkiel (2003) acknowledge that the increased prominence of stocks listed on NASDAQ 
is related to the upward trend in IV, but also attribute this rise to the corporate objectives of 
many firms to pursue higher growth.  They also posit that the volatility of individual stocks has 
increased recently even though overall market volatility has remained stable, a paradox which 
can be explained by declining correlations among stock returns.  From a portfolio management 
perspective, this trend implies that the importance of diversification is increasing.  
Research Idea #2: As volatility has been trending upward, the importance of diversifying one’s 
portfolio has increased.  Compare the benefits of diversification in both high-volatility and low-
volatility environments using a simulation approach. 
Practical Implication #2: It is important to be able to identify whether the present ‘volatility 
environment’ is low or high, relative to long-term historical levels because there are established 
links between both present volatility and future volatility, and between present volatility and 
future expected returns; thus, current volatility levels impacts investment decisions. 
DETERMINANTS OF CROSS-SECTIONAL VOLATILITY 
The tracking of cross-sectional volatility helps identify variability in returns among the best and 
worst performing portfolio managers.  Cross-sectional volatility will either rise with an increase in 
sector volatility, keeping the correlations of returns among sectors held constant, or with a 
decrease in cross-sector correlations, keeping sector volatility constant.  In 1999-2000, sector 
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volatility rose and cross-sector correlation declined simultaneously, creating a sudden and 
dramatic rise in cross-sectional volatility coincident with the technology boom and bust (Ankrim 
& Ding, 2002). 
When seeking to identify the determinants of volatility levels, both macroeconomic and 
microeconomic effects should be considered.  First, from a macro-level perspective, volatility is 
heavily influenced by the variability of interest rates, and the magnitude of change within the 
current business cycle.  If firms have large fixed costs (i.e. – operating leverage), profits will fall 
during recessions as demand falls; in fact, volatility is higher during recessions, since stock 
prices fall both before and during these times.  Behavioral patterns (e.g. – a ‘follow the herd’ 
mentality’) may magnify such effects, since stock prices tend to change more dramatically than 
the fundamentals would imply (e.g. - changes in the expectations of future dividends).  In other 
words, investors often will overreact to new information (Fridson, 2011).  Other macroeconomic 
factors include the extent of financial leverage assumed in the market, the extent of volatility in 
bond prices, whether or not a fad or bubble is under way, the variability of inflation rates, the 
rate of money growth, and trends in industrial production (Schwert, 1989). 
When firms increase the proportion of debt in their capital allocation, thereby assuming more 
financial leverage, stock volatility will increase.  Xu and Malkiel (2003) observed that firms with 
high growth strategies need to reinvent themselves from time to time, which requires investing 
in many high-risk projects, thus leading to higher firm-specific volatility.  This relationship 
between growth rates and volatility can be non-linear; for growth rates above 5%, the 
relationship is positive and approximately linear, but for low or negative growth rates, there is an 
inverse relationship, since such firms are more likely to be in financial distress.  Brandt et al. 
(2010) also find that volatility is higher for stocks that have performed poorly in the past, have 
lower liquidity, and do not pay any dividends. 
NASDAQ stocks are relatively more volatile because they tend to be include smaller companies, 
which have lower average stock prices than NYSE/AMEX stocks, and volatility has shown to be 
inversely related to both size and price.  Jiang and Lee (2006) state that smaller firms tend to 
have higher returns, but with also larger volatilities than smaller firms.  Xu and Malkiel (2003) 
also find that volatility is inversely related to firm size.  Campbell et al. (2001) find that both 
levels and trends for volatility are stronger for smaller firms, and also that volatility is inversely 
related to future output growth.  Brandt et al. (2010) focus more on stock prices than firm size, 
and state that volatility levels for low-priced stocks are 2-3 times higher than that for high-priced 
stocks.  Even after stock splits, they observe an increase in idiosyncratic volatility.  They also 
find that volatility is higher among NASDAQ stocks (which have more low-priced stocks), 
relative to NYSE/AMEX stocks.  While Xu and Malkiel (2003) establish a positive link between 
volatility levels and the percentage of institutional ownership in equities, Brandt et al. (2010) 
establish the opposite link, since retail investors typically prefer lower-priced, smaller-sized 
stocks that often exhibit higher volatility. 
Other studies have linked idiosyncratic volatility to various firm fundamentals, like earnings per 
share (EPS), return on equity (ROE), or cash flows.  For example, Fridson (2011) states that 
stocks with more variability in EPS reports over time have higher volatility, finding that this single 
factor accounts for at least 45% of volatility differences among the 30 Dow Jones stocks.  Most 
researchers have chosen to focus on earnings rather than dividends, since dividend levels are 
under the discretion of corporate managers, whereas earnings are a better reflection of a firm’s 
true performance and future prospects.  Smaller firms have even more variability in ROE levels 
than larger firms. As earnings, cash flows, and ROE levels fall, this signals trouble ahead, which 
causes investor jitters; however, if these shocks are positive, this tends to both lower upcoming 
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uncertainty and increase stock prices (Wei & Zhang, 2006).  Zhang (2010) agrees that the 
variability in ROE levels is useful in explaining return volatilities, especially for smaller and 
younger firms. 
Research Idea #3:  Volatility levels have been linked to macroeconomic factors like the 
variability of interest rates and the current state of the business cycle.  Verify whether or not 
these links still apply in recent years, when we have seen unusually low interest rates and some 
rather dramatic extremes in the past business cycle.  
Practical Implication #3: Although firms cannot do much to control the macroeconomic factors 
that impact volatility, they can potentially affect the idiosyncratic volatility of their own stock.  For 
example, a firm’s capital structure can impact volatility, since the more financial leverage a firm 
takes on, the more risky their asset cash flows are.  Also, firms that decide to pursue high-
growth strategies are willing to assume higher volatility in the hope of achieving higher returns. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RETURN AND VOLATILITY 
Stocks with large, positive sensitivities to market volatility tend to have lower average returns, 
and periods of high volatility tend to coincide with downward market movements.  Furthermore, 
Ang et al. (2006) found that stocks with high ‘idiosyncratic volatility’ (IV) also have lower average 
returns; in fact, between 1986 and 2000, stocks in the highest-volatility quintile underperformed 
stocks in the lowest-volatility quintile by about 1% per month.  Also, Blitz and Van Vliet (2007) 
observed that, for both U.S. and non-U.S. markets, stocks with the lowest historical volatility 
have a statistically significant positive alpha, whereas those with the greatest volatility are 
especially unattractive.  However, they also noted that this relationship disappears if the 
investment universe is restricted to large-cap stocks.  Darnell (2009) used U.S. equity data from 
2004-2008, and found that the correlation between returns on the S&P 500 and changes in the 
VIX was -0.8, meaning that there was a strong, inverse relationship between volatility levels and 
the performance of the S&P 500 index.  Meanwhile, Wei and Zhang (2006) found that ROEs 
and the Variance of ROEs are also negatively correlated, and that most of the recent upward 
trend in volatility can be explained by both the downward trend in ROE levels and the upward 
trend in the variance of these levels. 
One explanation for the possibly negative link between volatility and return is the asymmetry of 
returns across business cycles; that is, stocks with high volatility may have normal average 
returns in ‘up’ markets but have lower than average returns in ‘down’ markets, thus creating 
lower than average returns overall.  This may be because risk-averse agents will reduce the 
positions of their investments in the presence of increased uncertainty about future returns 
(Ang, et al., 2006).  An alternative explanation is that, in up markets, increases in productivity 
are accompanied by increases in investment.  This leads to higher growth rates, but these 
higher rates cannot be sustained in subsequent periods of low productivity, which then creates 
increasing stock volatility (Gomes, et al., 2003).  Others find that high-risk stocks have lower 
than average returns in down markets, but higher than average returns in up markets; however, 
the effect from the down market dominates the effect from the up market, so that the inverse 
relationship between risk (i.e., volatility) and return still occurs (Blitz & Van Vliet, 2007). 
The link between volatility and return is strong enough to suggest that traditional models like 
CAPM or the 3-factor model of Fama and French will lead to mispricing because of overreliance 
on a particular stock’s beta (Ang, et al., 2006).  For example, Blitz and Van Vliet (2007), 
acknowledging that volatility and beta are related measures, find that beta and a stock’s return 
are inversely related, whereas CAPM finds them to be directly related.  As a result, Bouchey 
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(2010) suggests an adjusted CAPM relies on a quadratic rather than a linear model, where 
returns initially rise with increased risk, but eventually get dragged down when volatility 
becomes excessive.  Stivers and Sun (2010) find that, in recessionary times, return dispersion 
is higher, and contains information that is positively linked to both subsequent market volatility, 
and increased unemployment.  Gomes et al. (2003) also discover that the dispersion of betas is 
lower around business cycle peaks and higher around business cycle troughs.  Also, with 
respect to investor sentiment, when sentiment is high, many investors will pick speculative 
stocks, which despite their higher risk levels, have lower future average returns than bond-like 
stocks (Baker & Wurgler, 2007).  
In contrast, Jiang and Lee (2006) find that, after correcting for serial correlation, volatility 
becomes directly related to stock returns, even though this effect appears to be delayed.  Many 
studies of stock volatility use an auto-regressive framework that includes only 1 or 2 lagged 
volatility measures in the regression, and by definition, do not account for volatilities being 
serially correlated over longer periods of time.  Much more so than returns, volatilities have 
substantial serial correlation since future volatility levels do relate strongly to past volatility 
levels.  Goyal and Santa Clara (2003) also find a positive relationship between ‘average stock 
variance’ and market returns, but find no link between market volatility and market returns.  
Here, average stock risk (in each month) is defined as the cross-sectional average of the 
variances of all stocks traded in a month.  Since this measure is mostly driven by IV, their 
findings are at odds with models that state that only systematic risk should affect returns.  One 
possible explanation for this effect: investors hold non-traded assets (e.g., human capital and 
private businesses), and when the risk of these assets increase, they are less willing to hold 
traded assets, and thus require an increase in the expected return of traded assets. 
Diavatopolous, Doran, and Peterson (2008) incorporate ‘implied volatility,’ as measured by 
option prices, to explore the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and future expected 
return.  ‘Implied volatility’ is the level of volatility, based on a theoretical option pricing model 
(Black & Scholes, 1973), that would produce the observed market price for a particular option.  
Diavatopolous et al. find that market expectations, as represented by implied volatility, provide 
better assessments of future volatility than past volatility, as given by historical volatility.  More 
specifically, they find a strong positive link between implied idiosyncratic volatility and future 
returns, but find no such link between historical volatility and future returns.   
Bali and Hovakimian (2009) also incorporate implied volatility, and consider both the relationship 
between the realized-implied volatility spread and expected returns, and the relationship 
between the call-put implied volatility spread and expected returns.  Implied volatilities typically 
exceed future realized volatilities, which creates a negative, realized-implied volatility spread 
(RIVS).  Bali and Hovakimian find that a trading strategy that longs stocks with low (i.e., more 
negative) RIVS and shorts stocks with high RIVS (i.e., less negative) produces positive returns 
because stocks with low realized volatilities tend to have higher returns.  Also, a high call-put 
implied volatility spread (CPIVS) indicates that call prices will exceed levels implied by put 
prices and put-call parity.  Bali and Hovakimian also find that a trading strategy that longs stocks 
with high (i.e., more positive) CPIVS and shorts stocks with low CPIVS produces positive 
returns because stocks with high CPIVS are likely to have higher returns. 
Research Idea #4: Some believe that high-volatility stocks behave normally in ‘up’ markets but 
perform relatively poorly in ‘down’ markets; others believe that high-volatility stocks perform 
relatively well in ‘up’ markets and perform relatively poorly in ‘down’ markets, but that the ‘down’ 
market effect dominates the ‘up’ market effect.  Explore which of these two theories is more 
correct. 
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Practical Implication #4: If a stock analyst can accurately estimate a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility, 
and knows whether this level is increasing or decreasing, there may be trading opportunities 
that can exploit the negative link between IV and future expected returns.  This is especially true 
for firms with either small market capitalization or a low stock price (or both). 
The next 3 sections (Factor Models…, The Momentum Anomaly, and Investor Sentiment) are 
primarily about stock returns rather than volatility directly.  However, these sections relate 
materially to volatility as discussed earlier.  In the upcoming section, several studies are cited 
which incorporate volatility as a factor.  In the ‘Momentum Anomaly’ section, a link between 
momentum and idiosyncratic volatility levels is formed.  Finally, in the ‘Investor Sentiment’ 
section, a link between investor sentiment and the prevailing volatility environment is 
established. 
FACTOR MODELS FOR EXPLAINING EXCESS RETURN 
Fama and French (1993) identified three risk factors that were associated with returns on U.S. 
stocks and bonds, when using data from 1963 to 1991.  In addition to the excess return of the 
market portfolio over the risk-free rate, which is the single factor represented in CAPM, they also 
found two new factors that were not previously part of CAPM.  First, they identified a ‘size’ 
effect, where firms with small capitalization outperformed firms with large capitalization.  
Second, they identified a ‘value’ effect, where firms with high book-to-market value ratios (i.e. – 
value stocks) outperformed firms with low book-to-market value ratios (i.e. – growth stocks).   
Gomes et al. (2003) also found evidence for both of these effects.  However, after controlling for 
beta, they found that these effects vanish because both the size and book-to-market ratio of a 
company are correlated with a firm’s beta.  Also, Ang et al. (2006) incorporated volatility to 
develop a two-factor model to predict expected return, with the two factors being the market’s 
excess return (as in CAPM) and daily changes in the VIX.  Jeegadesh and Titman (2001) 
expanded the Fama and French 3-factor model to include a momentum effect, and found that 
this effect persisted into the 1990s, unlike the value and size effects which were only statistically 
significant in the original 1963-1991 period.  They also found that loser stocks are more risky 
than winning stocks because they are more sensitive to all 3 factors from the Fama and French 
model.  Finally, Menchero and Morazov (2011) ambitiously attempted to use a global factor 
model to predict returns, where their model consisted of 48 country factors, 24 industry factors, 
and 8 style factors.  The 8 observed styles were: size, value, momentum, volatility, growth, 
leverage, liquidity, and non-linear size. 
In the early months of 2000, when the Dow stalled but the NASDAQ continued its bull run, 
growth stocks outperformed value stocks by a large amount.  However, after this episode, this 
trend reversed, and over a complete business cycle, value stocks typically outperform growth 
stocks.  Value stocks are thought to have lower relative risk than growth stocks, so that their 
outperformance is evidence that is inconsistent with CAPM.  Zhang (2005) found that the 
differential return of value stocks over growth stocks is highest in bad times, when book-to-
market value ratios are at their highest. 
Research Idea #5: There have been many factor models that have predicted a stock’s excess 
return, or separately, a stock’s idiosyncratic volatility.  Combine these two types of models into a 
unified framework, and identify a subset of factors that is associated with each measure. 
Practical Implication #5: Traders should resist simplistic strategies that attempt to exploit the 
‘size’ and ‘value’ effects from the FF3 model because these effects have not persisted since the 
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Fama and French paper identified them in 1993.  However, the ‘momentum’ effect, as 
discussed in the next section, has been more persistent, especially on a short-term basis. 
THE MOMENTUM ANOMALY 
The ‘momentum’ anomaly suggests that buying stocks with recent high returns and selling 
stocks with recent low returns will produce superior profits over time (Arena, et al., 2008).  The 
main proponents of this effect are Jeegadesh and Titman (1993), who found that winners from 
the past 3-12 months outperform losers over the next 3-12 months because markets may 
underreact to new information about a firm’s prospects, especially in the short-term.  Jeegadesh 
and Titman (2001) published a subsequent paper that used data from the 1990s, since their 
original paper only used data from 1965-1989, and unlike many other anomalies that were 
discovered during that period (e.g. – the ‘value’ and ‘size’ effects), the momentum effect 
continued to persist subsequently.  In the 1990s, the returns of past winners were, on average, 
higher than the returns of past losers by about 1% per year.  The authors offered three 
behavioral explanations for the success of momentum strategies.  First, traders may suffer from 
a self-attribution bias, as they attribute the performance of past winners to stock selection skills 
and the performance of past losers to bad luck.  Second, they may also be overconfident in their 
own abilities, which helps temporarily push up prices of past winners above their fundamental 
values.  Third, traders who favor technical analysis over fundamental analysis will more often 
buy past winners and sell past losers. 
However, after awhile, traders who favor more fundamental valuation will correct for the 
overreactions of the technical traders, which contributes to the reversal of price trends.  Thus, 
while investors may underreact to new information about companies in the short-term, they also 
overreact to such information in the long-term, which implies that any large momentum effect is 
often soon thereafter accompanied by a large reversal (Arena, et al., 2008; Bhojraj & 
Swaminathan, 2006).  Jeegadesh and Titman (1993) acknowledge that the benefits of a 
momentum strategy dissipate after about 12 months, and there may even be negative 
differential returns from such a strategy 12-30 months after portfolio formation.  They also found 
that, with respect to earnings announcements, past winners do better 7 months later, but past 
losers do better 13 months later. 
Stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility (IV) often have greater momentum returns than those 
with lower IV, but also have quicker and larger reversals than lower IV stocks.  This 
phenomenon occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when both momentum effects and IV 
were abnormally strong (Arena, et al., 2008).  Bulkley and Nawosah (2009) found that the 
momentum effect vanishes when controlling for cross-sectional variation in expected returns 
(which means that cross-sectional volatility is quite important in explaining momentum).  Stivers 
and Sun (2010) used data from 1962-2005 to show that the cross-sectional return dispersion of 
U.S. stocks is directly related to the future excess return of ‘value’ strategies over ‘momentum’ 
strategies, and inversely related to this past excess return.  Thus, when volatility is high, as 
tends to occur when bad times are ahead, value strategies perform better, but when volatility is 
low, as tends to occur in bull markets, momentum strategies do better. 
Other factors may also affect the potential success of momentum strategies.  For example, the 
amount of news released about a particular company contributes directly to that stock’s 
momentum, especially if the news is unfavorable (Arena, et al., 2008).  Bhojraj and 
Swaminathan (2006) found that this trend was most noticeable for low-to-mid-cap stocks, low-
priced stocks, and less followed stocks.  Jeegadesh and Titman (1993) discovered that the 
momentum effect is more dominant for smaller firms, and for firms with higher betas.  
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Furthermore, they observed some seasonality in that abnormal returns from momentum 
strategies are significantly greater during the months of April, November, and December, but 
are significantly smaller in January.  They also found the momentum reversal effects to be 
stronger for smaller firms, and attributed this to the higher volatility of smaller-sized firms 
(Jeegadesh & Titman, 2001).   
Leveraged ETFs (exchange-traded funds) add exposure after good performance, and remove 
exposure after bad performance, thus contributing to volatility risk (Bouchey, 2010).  Contrarians 
take an opposite approach, whereby they sell assets that have recently gone up, and use the 
proceeds to buy other assets that have recently gone down.  This strategy of ‘systematic 
rebalancing’ may work to control volatility or minimize downside risk, but requires discipline 
since it is contrary to human nature.  Bulkley and Nawosah (2009) find that strategies that 
ignore momentum are consistently better than those based on recent performance, and thus 
claim that full sample means (over a much longer past period of time) are a better estimate of 
upcoming expected returns than returns observed during a much smaller past sub-period. 
Research Idea #6: Contrarians use ‘systematic rebalancing’ to sell assets in ‘up’ markets and 
buy assets in ‘down’ markets, thus managing volatility, whereas leveraged ETFs take the 
opposite approach, thus assuming more volatility risk.  Compare the returns of these strategies 
in both high-volatility environments and low-volatility environments using a simulation approach. 
Practical Implication #6: Technical analysts often exploit the ‘momentum’ effect to their 
advantage.  To review, winning stocks from the past 3-12 months outperform losing stocks over 
the next 3-12 months; however, after this future period expires, these same stocks may have 
inferior returns over subsequent time periods due to a reestablishment of investors beliefs. 
INVESTOR SENTIMENT 
Evidence from the behavioral finance literature has indicated that investors are subject to 
sentiment, and that there are times when betting against this sentiment can be both costly and 
risky (Baker & Wurgler, 2007).  For example, in the late 1990s, investor sentiment for 
speculative and difficult-to-value technology stocks helped push prices to ultra-high levels, 
which was shortly followed by a severe market correction.  During times of high sentiment, stock 
price changes will be much larger in magnitude than what would be justifiable based on 
dividend-based valuation models (Shiller, 1981).  Portfolio managers often have incentives to 
invest in speculative stocks, as they may be compensated based on the ability to obtain a 
higher alpha.  This incentive structure can lead to the overpricing of high-risk stocks (and 
underpricing of low-risk stocks) since new money tends to flow toward assets that have done 
well in the recent past.  Investment managers are more willing to overpay for risky, high-volatility 
stocks, especially in a ‘layered’ investment approach, where there is a lower-risk, safer layer 
that is designed to avoid poverty and a higher-risk, more speculative layer that is designed to 
procure some huge positive returns (Blitz and Van Vliet, 2007).   
Investor sentiment is difficult to measure directly, but proxies like trading volume and liquidity 
measures can be used to indirectly infer what the market’s prevailing mood might be.  A stock’s 
bid-ask spread is inversely related to its liquidity.  Guo and Savickas (2006) found that bid-ask 
spread is directly related to future excess stock returns, but that volume or turnover is inversely 
related to future excess stock returns.  A stock’s idiosyncratic volatility (IV) is also used as a 
proxy for both its liquidity risk and dispersion of opinion.  When IV rises in an ‘up market’, this 
may be indicative of investor overconfidence which can lead to substantial investment mistakes 
(Brandt, et al., 2010).   
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The stocks of smaller and younger companies with a shorter record of profitability are typically 
subject to higher levels of investor sentiment.  These stocks have above-average volatility, pay 
fewer dividends (if any at all), and are often growth companies.  Furthermore, they have little to 
no earnings history, and are often valued based on prevailing sentiment rather than on firm 
fundamentals.  Thus, such stocks do relatively well when the market is booming, since this is 
exactly when the propensity to speculate is the highest.  Stocks of firms in financial distress 
(whether young or more established) are also subject to broad waves of investor sentiment, and 
are difficult to both arbitrage and value in general (Baker & Wurgler, 2007). 
Research Idea #7: Some investment managers knowingly speculate on risky, high-volatility 
stocks, hoping that at least a small number of these investments will achieve ultra-high returns.  
Perform a retrospective study of the most volatile stocks, and after adjusting for risk, observe 
the proportion that had very high returns, the proportion that had very low returns, and the 
amount of value gained by the winning stocks relative to the amount of value lost by the losing 
stocks. 
Practical Implication #7: In the early stages for when investor sentiment is high, it is risky to be 
on the sidelines while a market overreaction is contributing to rising prices; however, after 
investor sentiment has been high for some time, the risk becomes that of a market correction, 
whereby stock prices fall back to their fundamental-based ‘intrinsic value;’ Be cautious when 
investor sentiment (on a particular stock) is high, but the stock’s idiosyncratic volatility is rising. 
In the remaining sections, the focus switches from a discussion on idiosyncratic volatility trends 
to an overview of recent ‘extreme volatility’ events.  Note that these are two separate constructs, 
whereby the main difference is that ‘extreme volatility’ events are much less predictable than IV 
patterns, and often occur without any prior warning.  Although the number of ‘extreme volatility’ 
events is positively correlated with the prevailing volatility environment, these events can and do 
also occur during low-volatility regimes.  It is challenging to hedge against the risk of such 
events, but both liquidity management and derivatives can be utilized, each of which is 
discussed below. 
EXAMPLES OF EXTREME VOLATILITY EVENTS 
In addition to identifying trends in volatility over long periods of time, one can also focus on 
shorter-term events that lead to extreme market volatility.  Although the definition of ‘extreme’ is 
somewhat arbitrary, Brandt et al. (2010) define ‘attention grabbing events’ as “days where a 
stock’s return is at least 3 standard deviations higher or at least 1.5 standard deviations lower 
than the mean daily return on that stock, or where the daily turnover is at least 3 standard 
deviations higher than the mean turnover level.”  Although overall market volatility has not 
increased substantially through time, firm-specific IV has increased, and on any particular 
trading day, the most volatile stocks typically move by very large percentages, often 25% or 
more (Campbell, et al., 2001).  Xu and Malkiel (2003) isolate individual stocks that endured 
price changes of at least 25% in a single day, and find that this most often occurs when reported 
earnings are different from earlier forecasts, especially if such earnings updates fall short of 
prior expectations.  The majority of institutional investors will react swiftly, and in similar fashion, 
to announcements of earnings surprises.  Waller (2009) analyzes extreme market volatility by 
counting the number of occurrences in a calendar year where the closing value of the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average is at least 1% changed from the previous daily close.  In 2008, 134 of 
the 253 trading days, or 53% of all days observed had at least a 1% change in the DJIA, which 
was a level of ‘volatility’ not observed in the markets since the early 1930s.  This proportion was 
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more than 3 times larger than the average ratio of 15.6% observed in the relatively quiet days of 
the period from 2004 to 2007.   
Times of extreme volatility also tend to be times of extreme illiquidity in the market.  For 
example, there was a large volatility spike in October 1987, when the VIX (calculated 
retrospectively after its inception in 1993) jumped from 22% at the start of the month to 61% by 
month’s end; this was due to the portfolio insurance meltdown on October 19, 1987.  Also, in 
late August 1998, the VIX suddenly reached 48% due to fears that the Russian government 
would either devalue the ruble or default on government bonds (or both).  In contrast, the 
average level of the VIX between 1986 and 2000 was only approximately 22% (Ang, et al., 
2006).  On August 13, 1998, Russian markets were closed for 35 minutes due to severe 
illiquidity and downward price pressure.  In the recent financial crisis, the Dow fell 49% between 
October 2007 and February 2009 amid very high (and persistently high) volatility levels, levels 
that were even higher than that observed between 1998 and 2002.  Volatility levels were higher 
in 1987 than observed during the financial crisis, but this was almost entirely due to one day 
(October 19, 1987).  Guo and Savickas (2006), when attempting to study volatility over long 
periods of time, replaced observed volatility levels on October 19, 1987 with the 2nd largest 
observation in the sample sub-period, so as to not confound the rest of their analysis.  The only 
calendar year in U.S. financial history that had volatility patterns similar to that observed in 2008 
(and the first quarter of 2009) was 1937 (Darnell, 2009).  Finally, the ‘flash crash’ of May 6, 
2010, which related to high-volume, technologically-advanced trading, also occurred amid 
unusually high volatility and thinning liquidity.   
A hot research topic in actuarial science the past 10-15 years has been the modeling of tail risk.  
This was especially prevalent during the recent financial crisis since prior models failed to 
adequately estimate either the frequency or severity of ‘tail-type’ events in 2007 or 2008 
(Darnell, 2009).  Many of these prior models, such as those based on the Markowitz framework 
from the early 1960s, had relied on the assumption that price changes follow a normal 
distribution.  However, empirical data has repeatedly shown that extreme price changes (which 
are captured in the tails) occur more frequently than what a ‘normal’ distribution, or a Geometric 
Brownian motion framework, would predict (Farmer, et al., 2004).  Now, the consensus is that a 
non-Gaussian, fatter-tailed distribution should be employed to model stock returns, and if 
possible, the volatility of these returns should be allowed to fluctuate through time.  Fuentes et 
al. (2009) believe that, on any given trading day, returns are actually well described by a normal 
distribution, but across longer timeframes, this characterization will change due to volatility 
levels drifting over time. 
Darnell (2009) identifies the primary drivers of tail events as currency crises, defaults by 
sovereign bond issuers, terrorist events, or anything else that investors would have a difficult 
time imagining in advance.  Many practitioners believe that such events cannot be captured by 
a quantitative model, but rather, investors should simply used good judgment (based on past 
experience) to anticipate these events.  Tails on the low end of the return distribution are now 
fatter (and more frequently observed) than they were 15-20 years ago because of the greater 
systemic risk that permeates the markets.  However, stocks that are more heavily traded, and 
thus have ample liquidity, are largely immune to this increasing prevalence of extreme volatility 
(Farmer, et al., 2004).  Shiller (1981) observed that stock price change distributions not only had 
fat tails, but high kurtosis (i.e., – low peakedness around a mean level), and attributed this effect 
to the tendency for new information about stocks to arrive in big jumps (and at unpredictable 
times), rather than arriving in a more smooth, continuous fashion. 
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Research Idea #8: There has been much recent attention in financial and actuarial research on 
quantifying tail risk, with focus on managing downside risk.  Compare the behavior of the upper 
tails to that of the lower tails, and determine which tail occurs more often, or in greater deviation 
from the mean, than the other tail. 
Practical Implication #8: In the past 25 years, tail risk events have occurred with higher 
frequency (and with greater severity) than traditional financial models would have predicted.  
This is partly because contagion effects are stronger now than they had been before.  On the 
plus side, these ‘extreme volatility’ events have partly led to the creation and development of 
‘enterprise risk management’ in many corporations. 
MANAGING LIQUIDITY AMID EXTREME VOLATILITY 
Liquidity problems occur when changes in supply and demand do not occur in orderly fashion, 
which causes volatility changes to be more pronounced.  For example, if there are gaps in filled 
price levels in the limit order book, illiquidity will result (Farmer, et al., 2004).  When a significant 
news event occurs, either in relation to a specific company or the market as a whole, trading 
volume will be higher when there is a wider dispersion of investor beliefs.  This dispersion will 
temporarily lead to higher volatility, that is, until the market has fully processed the new 
information and equilibrium is reestablished (Lee, et al., 1994).  Schwert (1989) asserts three 
reasons for a positive relationship between volume and volatility.  First, new information causes 
changes in both prices and trading patterns by necessity, especially if there are differences in 
how to interpret the information.  Second, some investors base trading decisions purely on price 
movements, so that large price changes will naturally beget larger trading volume.  Third, if 
there is short-term price pressure due to illiquidity, large trading volume in one direction (either 
buy or sell) will cause price movements (either up or down, respectively).  The main categories 
for news events that primarily affect a single company include: acquisitions and divestitures, 
capital structure changes, takeovers and leveraged buyouts, legal news, and general financial 
information.  The most frequently observed category is takeover announcements (Lee, et al., 
1994).   
To illustrate liquidity management during crises that are broad enough to affect the entire 
market, we can focus on extreme volatility events, such as the October 1987 and October 1997 
crashes.  After the 1987 crash, some regulators suggested that circuit breakers be introduced 
so that the market could buy time to process any new information that may adversely affect 
prices during times of insufficient liquidity balance.  This would (theoretically) lower the 
information asymmetries between traders, and would permit the orderly emergence of new 
consensus prices (Lee, et al., 1994).  Soon thereafter, circuit breakers were actually put in 
place, but they did not prove to be effective in managing future extreme volatility events.  On 
October 27, 1997, investors who were afraid that circuit breakers would kick in and close the 
market prematurely, started a large selloff that accelerated price declines in the last minutes of 
trading before the circuit breakers were actually implemented.  After an initial 350 point decline, 
there was a 30-minute trading halt, and after the market reopened, the Dow lost an additional 
200 points, which then triggered a 2nd early market shutdown.  In all, the DJIA lost 7% of its 
total value that day.  Soon afterwards, the NYSE decided to ease the levels at which circuit 
breakers were activated, and on September 1, 1998, these looser standards allowed the 
markets to remain open until normal closing time, even though the Dow plummeted by over 500 
points that day.  The new standards required a one-hour trading halt, but only if the market 
dropped by 20% before 2:00p EST, a 30-minute break if the drop occurred before 2:30p, and no 
break being allowed after that time.  In the end, circuit breakers were deemed ineffective 
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because they simply transferred selling pressure from the stock market to the growing futures 
market (Keegan, 1998). 
Lee et al. (1994) studied the effects of firm-specific trading halts on the NYSE, which were 
characterized as occurring during “unusual market situations,” lasting about an hour, and 
consisting of an average absolute change in return of about 8%.  They also found trading halts 
to be ineffective, claiming that they neither reduced trading volume or price volatility; that is, the 
halts did not achieve the goal of creating a ‘calming down’ period that would allow for the 
emergence of a new consensus price in an orderly fashion.  To the contrary, volume and 
volatility were even higher in the 1-3 day period after a trading halt than that observed before 
the halt.  This may be because various traders (during a halt) are unwilling or unable to reveal 
their true demands fully.  Furthermore, Lee et.al. (1994) acknowledge that, in times of around-
the-clock financial media coverage, the press may exasperate these negative effects as 
investors dump their holdings in fear that they may otherwise suffer even greater losses.  
Approximately 75% of all trading halts simply resulted in delayed market openings, rather than 
actually stopping trading in the middle of a trading period.  There is also evidence of a 
momentum effect upon trading halts, whereby once markets reopen after halts caused by 
upward price pressure, day-1 returns are positive, but once they reopen after halts caused by 
downward price pressure, day-1 returns are negative.  Most of the wildest price swings take 
place within the first half-hour, though, after markets reopen.  Surprisingly, the majority of 
trading halts are imposed upon the receipt of news that contributed to increases in a particular 
stock price, usually when a firm is announced as a takeover target. 
Research Idea #9: Determine the leading reasons for past examples of extreme volatility in U.S. 
equity markets, as identified by daily % changes in major market indices above a specified 
threshold, and comment on whether this ranking has changed through time.   
Note: An overview of the top 100 most volatile days in the S&P 500 index between 2000-2012, 
with proposed reasons for these events, is provided in the ‘Appendix.’. 
Practical Implication #9: A liquidity crisis in the stock market results primarily from an imbalance 
between buyers and sellers.  This typically occurs in special circumstances, such as right after a 
major news announcement that either affects an individual stock or the market as a whole.  
Circuit breakers and trading halts have been used to manage extreme illiquidity, but these tools 
have been largely unsuccessful. 
MANAGING VOLATILITY WITH DERIVATIVES 
The two major uses for derivatives are speculation and hedging.  When speculating with 
derivatives, a particular market view is adapted, and if correct, due to the potential benefits of 
financial leverage, the return will be magnified relative to investing only in the underlying asset.  
With hedging, one attempts to reduce portfolio risk by using derivatives that have payoffs that 
vary inversely with that of the underlying asset, thus limiting potential losses.  Volatility can be 
managed directly using some combination of call and put options in both hedging and 
speculating contexts.  For example, from a hedging perspective, one can lock in a desired 
volatility level by using the right allotment of long puts and short calls.  Moreover, the premiums 
from the short calls can be used to offset the premiums from the long puts so that the desired 
volatility exposure can be obtained at no cost (Bouchey, 2010). 
Options can also be used to speculate on future volatility levels, whereby one either takes long 
or short positions as to the direction that volatility will move.  Long volatility positions, obtained 
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by buying either call or put options, are like insurance in that they lose money most often, but 
also provide downside protection; that is, the option premiums must be paid up front whether 
the options eventually have positive payoffs or not.  The expected payoffs will increase as 
volatility increases, hence the position being labeled ‘long volatility.’  Traders that believe 
volatility will rise in the future can either buy options, straddles or strangles to capitalize on this 
view if correct.  A straddle consists of a long call and a long put on the same stock such that 
both options have the same strike price and time to expiration.  A strangle is similar to a straddle 
except that now, both options are out-of-the-money, so as to reduce the overall premium outlay.  
Such buyers should beware, though, if the volatility environment is already high at the time such 
options are purchased, since periods of prolonged high volatility are often followed by periods of 
prolonged low volatility (Waller, 2009). 
In contrast, short volatility positions, obtained by selling either call or put options (or writing 
straddles or strangles), are like selling insurance.  Although the expected profit on such 
strategies is positive, there is also heavy, potentially unlimited, exposure to downside tail risk if 
volatility increases in the future.  In the mid-2000s, a strong preference existed for ‘short 
volatility positions,’ since the premiums received from these positions exceeded the payoffs that 
were ultimately made.  However, once the financial crisis occurred, this relationship dramatically 
reversed.  If investors want superior returns in down markets, it is more appropriate to use a mix 
of Treasuries, short sales, and derivatives consistent with ‘long volatility positions’ (Darnell, 
2009). 
Research Idea #10: Conduct a historical comparison between ‘long volatility’ and ‘short volatility’ 
positions/strategies, using either real option pricing data or simulation techniques, and 
demonstrate why speculating on future volatility levels is so risky. 
Practical Implication #10: Derivatives are the primary tool that investment professionals utilize to 
manage volatility, whether reducing risk by hedging or leveraging risk by speculating on the 
future volatility trend.  Examples of such tools include call options, put options, straddles and 
strangles.  Note that an episode of high volatility is often followed by an episode of low volatility, 
and vice-versa. 
CONCLUSION: SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
The three primary purposes of this paper have been to: 
 Establish the importance of understanding volatility amid the new ‘high volatility’ 
environment so that investors are more informed to make decisions about risk and return 
in a unified framework. 
 Review the recent literature on volatility research, with particular focus on idiosyncratic 
volatility, the reasons for why it has increased, the factors that affect its level, and the 
relationship between IV levels and future expected return. 
 Suggest ten ideas for future volatility research (as relates to the prior literature review), 
while identifying ten associated practical implications that may be of interest to both 
academics and practitioners. 
The most essential findings from this paper, as linked to the primary question of interest for 
each section, are organized as shown in Table 1. 
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TABLE1.  SUMMARY OF MOST ESSENTIAL FINDINGS (by Section) 
No. Section Title Most Essential Findings 
1 Idiosyncratic Volatility 
(IV) 
 IV isolates the price risk for an individual firm 
 There are 2 approaches for estimating IV: taking the 
variance of residuals from a factor model for excess 
returns (direct method), and taking the difference between 
the total variance of stock returns and the variance of 
market returns 
2 Explanations for 
Volatility Trending 
Upward 
 Increased institutional ownership 
 Increased volatilities of firm fundamentals 
 Newly listed firms are becoming younger and riskier 
 Product markets are becoming more competitive 
 Corporate objectives to pursue higher growth 
3 Determinants of Cross-
Sectional Volatility 
 Macroeconomic Effects: variability of interest rates, 
characterization of the business cycle 
 Microeconomic effects: extent to which firms employ 
financial leverage, recent stock returns 
4 The Relationship 
Between Return and 
Volatility 
 Market volatility is negatively associated with market 
returns, especially in recessionary times 
 For idiosyncratic volatility, the corresponding evidence is 
inconclusive; many also found a negative link, but others, 
after controlling for firm size, found no such link 
5 Factor Models for 
Explaining Excess 
Return 
 CAPM uses ‘market risk premium’ only 
 FF3 also incorporates ‘size’ and ‘value’ effects 
 Others also incorporate a ‘momentum’ effect 
 Loser stocks are especially sensitive to these factors 
6 The Momentum 
Anomaly 
 Initially, buying winner stocks and selling loser stocks is a 
winning strategy (for 3-12 months) 
 However, thereafter, there is a momentum reversal, 
whereby past winners underperform 
 Stocks with higher IV have more momentum 
7 Investor Sentiment  During times of high sentiment, the market will overreact, 
relative to what the fundamentals say 
 When IV rises in ‘up’ markets, this reflects investor 
overconfidence and a poor attempt to increase alpha 
8 Examples of Extreme 
Volatility Events 
 An ‘extreme volatility’ event can be defined in terms of 
abnormal price changes or volume levels 
 Examples include Portfolio Insurance (10/19/87), the 
Russian crisis (8/13/98), the recent Financial Crisis (late 
2007 – early 2009), and the Flash Crash (5/6/10) 
9 Managing Liquidity 
Amid Extreme Volatility 
 Illiquidity can cause a short-term volatility spike 
 Volatility will be higher when there is a wider dispersion of 
investor beliefs, especially before market corrections 
 Circuit breakers and trading halts have been largely 
ineffective at managing volatility spikes 
10 Managing Volatility with 
Derivatives 
 Options (Calls and Puts) and Option Strategies (Straddles 
and Strangles) can be used to either hedge volatility risk 
or speculate on future volatility levels 
 Both long and short volatility positions are possible; long 
positions are safer but have lower expected return 
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FUTURE RESEARCH RELATING TO EXTREME VOLATILITY 
There is still much research to be done in order to understand volatility trends, factors that affect 
volatility at both the company and market levels, and the management of volatility amid 
conditions of economic duress.  This is especially true for extreme volatility events, since the 
finance literature has much less complete coverage on this topic.  
For example, what happens to the markets 1 day, 2 days, 1 week, etc., after these extreme 
volatility events occur; that is, do these short-term volatility episodes persist, and if so, do prices 
continue in their current direction, or is there a market correction?  Many of the most dramatic 
price movements are simply results of market corrections (after an earlier overreaction by 
investors).  Thus, any methodology that could identify whether extreme movements are part of a 
sustained bull or bear market versus a simple market correction would be helpful.  Finally, this 
paper has focused predominantly on U.S. markets, but one could also compare extreme market 
volatility in the U.S. to that of other developed (and developing) world markets.  Furthermore, do 
volatility trends in U.S. markets tend to lead other world markets, or lag in reaction to them? 
Extreme volatility can also be analyzed at levels smaller than the market itself.  For example, 
which industries experience the most financial instability, and does the answer to this question 
vary within or among business cycles?  One could consider all of the stocks on U.S. exchanges 
that have experienced extreme movements (e.g. – price changes of at least 25%) between 
consecutive trading days, and identify some common factors among these stocks.  In addition, 
among all of these firm-specific occurrences, what proportion of these events can be attributed 
to extreme volatility in the markets on those days versus the proportion that have explanations 
that are more isolated to a particular firm?  Also, what does the recent data reveal about the 
relationship between firm-specific volatility and subsequent realized returns, both during and 
after the financial crisis?  Finally, as models from both the ‘behavioral finance’ and ‘technical 
analysis’ literature continue to develop, how can they be used to better understand the 
decisions of investors amid essential moments in price change history? 
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GLOSSARY: VOLATILITY TYPES AND DEFINITIONS 
VOLATILITY TYPE DEFINITION 
‘Bad’ volatility Volatility due to political risk, systematic risk, and other 
country-specific forces that firms cannot control, which 
tends to prevent growth and productivity, and promote 
instability 
Cross-sectional volatility The dispersion of stock returns over a single sub-period 
of time 
Expected idiosyncratic volatility The volatility resulting from an AR(2) time series model, 
which uses the idiosyncratic volatility from the past two 
months as predictive factors 
Fama-and-French idiosyncratic 
volatility 
See Idiosyncratic volatility, except now the residuals are 
based on a model that contains three factors: size, 
value, and market return 
Firm-specific volatility See Idiosyncratic volatility 
‘Good’ volatility Volatility due to conditions associated with greater 
economic welfare, like greater incentives for firms to 
take risk, become more innovative, and pursue growth 
strategies 
Historical volatility The standard deviation of a stock’s continuously 
compounded returns over a past period of time 
Idiosyncratic volatility An estimate of an individual firm’s current volatility level, 
which is usually based on the standard deviation of the 
residuals from a factor model for excess returns 
Implied volatility The specific volatility level that, according to a 
theoretical option pricing model, would produce the 
observed option price on the market 
Industry-level volatility The volatility of a specific industry’s returns across a 
single period of time 
Intertemporal volatility The dispersion of periodic stock returns over a long 
time horizon 
Market volatility The volatility of the market return across a single period 
of time 
Total volatility The sum of idiosyncratic volatility, industry-level 
volatility, and market volatility; also, see historical 
volatility 
Unexpected idiosyncratic volatility The difference between idiosyncratic volatility and 
expected idiosyncratic volatility 
VIX A volatility index, which measures the implied volatility 
of synthetic, one-month, at-the-money options on the 
S&P 500 index 
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APPENDIX 
THE TOP 100 MOST VOLATILE DAYS IN S&P 500 INDEX, 2000-2012, AS 
MEASURED BY DAILY % PRICE CHANGE 
 
Year # of Days 
in Top 
100  
Dates of ‘Up’ Days Dates of ‘Down’ Days 
2000 5 3/16, 10/19, 12/5 1/4, 4/14 
2001 7 1/3, 4/5, 4/18, 9/24 3/12, 4/3, 9/17 
2002 14 5/8, 7/5, 7/24, 7/29, 8/14, 10/1, 
10/10, 10/11, 10/15 
7/10, 7/19, 7/22, 8/5, 9/3 
2003 3 3/13, 3/17 3/24 
2004 0 - - 
2005 0 - - 
2006 0 - - 
2007 1 - 2/27 
2008 38 3/11, 3/18, 4/1, 9/18, 9/19, 9/30, 
10/13, 10/16, 10/20, 10/28, 11/4, 
11/13, 11/21, 11/24, 11/26, 12/2, 
12/5, 12/8, 12/16 
9/9, 9/15, 9/17, 9/22, 9/29, 10/2, 
10/6, 10/7, 10/9, 10/15, 10/22, 
10/24, 11/5, 11/6, 11/12, 11/14, 
11/19, 11/20, 12/1 
2009 18 1/21, 1/28, 2/24, 3/10, 3/12, 3/23, 
4/9, 5/4 
1/14, 1/20, 1/29, 2/10, 2/17, 
2/23, 3/2, 3/5, 3/30, 4/20 
2010 3 5/10 5/20, 6/4 
2011 11 8/9, 8/11, 8/23, 10/10, 10/27, 
11/30 
8/4, 8/8, 8/10, 8/18, 11/9 
2012 0 - - 
 
Note: To be in the top 100 (shown above), the daily % price change, as defined by the natural 
log of the ratio between consecutive daily closing prices, had to be at least 3.30% in either 
direction; 52 of 100 days were ‘up’ moves and 48 of 100 were ‘down’ moves.   
The four primary categories for the main drivers of these price changes were: 
 New information relating to macroeconomic data (approximately 1/3 of the occurrences) 
 Market corrections in the opposite direction from what had occurred in days before (1/3)  
 New information relating to company-specific announcements (1/6) 
 Policy announcements (current/actual or future/expected) from the Federal Reserve 
(1/6)    
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Key Finance Events Relating to Particular Volatility Episodes, 2000-2012: 
 3/12/01-4/18/01: earnings of technology firms different than prior expectations 
 9/17/01-9/24/01: market effects from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 
 7/5/02-10/15/02: investors lose trust due to accounting scandals (e.g., Enron, Worldcom) 
 3/13/03-3/24/03: uncertainty about the extent of upcoming U.S. activity in Iraq 
 3/11/08-4/01/08: positively received efforts by the Fed.Reserve to address ‘credit crunch’ 
 9/9/08-12/16/08: peak months of banking/financial crisis (e.g., Lehman Bro., AIG, Citi) 
 1/14/09-5/4/09: government bailouts are made to banks and auto companies 
 5/10/10-6/4/10: trouble throughout world markets, especially in European banks 
 8/4/11-8/23/11: downgrade of U.S. debt and associated Fed stimulus programs 
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